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CONSENT FOR AMICUS FILING 
This Court granted permission for Amicus briefing on December 20, 2011. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW, STATEMENT OF THE CASE, AND ISSUES 
PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
As amicus curiae, the Utah Association for Justice refers to the Standard of 
Review, Statement of the Case, and Issues Presented on Appeal as set forth by 
Appellants, and incorporates them as if set forth fully herein. 
STATEMENT OF INTEREST 
The Utah Association for Justice ("UAJ") is a statewide organization comprised 
of attorneys committed to protecting the rights of persons who have been injured in their
 ( 
person or property, and who turn to the courts for judicial redress. In promoting these 
interests, UAJ seeks to preserve a fair, prompt, open and efficient administration of 
i 
justice. 
UAJ members represent injured people in the vast majority of personal injury tort 
actions in this state. The Court's decision on whether or not pre-injury releases are valid < 
and its consideration of Utah public policy will impact virtually every one of those 
actions, as well as future personal injury litigation. Thus, the resolution of this case 
significantly impacts the parties to this action, as well as thousands of tort victims 
throughout the State of Utah as well. 
< 
v -
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Utah Const. Art, i § 1: 
All men have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy and defend their 
lives and liberties; to acquire, possess and protect property; to worship 
according to the dictates of their consciences; to assemble peaceably, 
protest against wrongs, and petition for redress of grievances; to 
communicate freely their thoughts and opinions, being responsible for the 
abuse of that right. 
Utah Const. Art. L§ 11: 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his 
person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, 
which shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no 
person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in 
this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party. 
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
"[T]he very meaning of public policy is the interest of others than the parties, and that 
interest is not to be at the mercy of the defendant alone."1 
Imagine a new recreational activity that has become the latest craze, it is called 
"Hangman"—as part of an "old west" recreational facility, thrill seeking participants can 
be "hanged" as a criminal or horse thief. The gallows fully emulates a real life gallows, 
so that participants can have the complete experience, right down to falling through a trap 
door with a noose around their neck. The gallows, of course, is rigged so that the 
participant lands on a soft pad just prior to the time the rope runs out of length. The 
activity catches on as a new "near death" extreme sport, and thousands of adrenaline 
1
 Beasley v. Tex. & P. Ry. Co., 191 U.S. 492, 498 (1903) (Holmes, O.W.). 
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junkie thrill seekers start participating in the activity. The participants all know the 
inherent risks such as rope burn, or splinters from the wooden deck. 
In order to keep the business profitable and reduce expensive premiums associated 
with liability insurance, the business owners require that all participants sign a preinjury, 
exculpatory agreement. Specifically, the owners immunize themselves against any and all 
claims for injury, damages or loss as a result of negligence by the owner, their agents or 
employees. One day, because he is not paying attention, a minimum wage operator at the 
Hangman activity is checking his text messages as he winds out a new noose for the 
day's activity. He mistakenly shortens the noose by six inches. And, on this one fateful 
day, a middle aged father of three is rendered a quadriplegic. The father loses his job, and 
eventually his health insurance. He applies for and receives social security disability. He 
applies for and receives state Medicaid benefits. His wife, always a homemaker and 
mom, takes a minimum wage job. But, with three children, the family can't make ends 
meet and are forced to further apply for and rely upon state aid. 
Approving exculpatory contracts implicitly condones as 'good' public policy the 
shifting of costs and consequences of a business' own negligence back onto the public at 
large. However, if an activity is so riddled with danger that it cannot profitably obtain 
insurance, the better policy is to not subsidize that dangerous activity through the shifting 
of private costs to the public. 
The legislature, in the case of equine activities, i.e., horseback riding, expressly 
preserved liability for negligence not once or twice, but three times within the Equine 
Liability Act. Owners remain liable for equipment failure "due to the sponsor's or 
vii 
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professional's negligence."2 Operators also remain liable if they fail to "make reasonable 
efforts to determine whether the equine or livestock could behave in a manner consistent 
with the activity with the participant."0 In addition to the specifically enumerated duties, 
the Equine Act also retains liability for commits an act or omission that constitutes 
negligence."4 The legislative voice speaks against ill-advised attempts to shift 
consequences of horse owner's negligence back upon the public at large. 
Additionally, public policy further weighs against the enforcement of preinjury 
releases. Utah has endorsed "the prevailing view that the law disfavors preinjury 
exculpatory agreements."5 Nevertheless, this Court has acknowledged that, "despite its 
flaws," the "general principle that preinjury releases are enforceable" is a part of Utah's 
common law, though it is subject to certain exceptions.6 One of those exceptions is 
where the preinjury release violates public policy. 
This case asks the Court to consider whether public policy invalidates a preinjury 
exculpatory agreement that Appellants required Appellee to sign prior to participating in 
recreational horseback riding activities. Amicus curiae Utah Association for Justice 
asserts that Utah has a strong policy interest in promoting safe recreational opportunities 
2
 Utah Code Ann. § 78B-4-202(2)(a)(iii) (West 2012). 
Id. at (2)(b) (emphasis added). 
4
 Id. at 2(d)(1). 
5
 Berry v. Greater Park City, Co., 2007 UT 87, 1 14, 171 P.3d 442 (citing Hanks v. 
Powder Ridge Rest. Corp., 276 Conn. 314, 885 A.2d 734, 739 (2005)). 
6
 See id. at 1113-14. 
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accessible to its citizens. Utah being billed as a recreational destination, sponsors of such 
activities are engaged in public services, and ought to act with reasonable care. 
Preinjury exculpatory releases for recreational horseback riding activities are 
contrary to public policy inasmuch as they remove the deterrent force of tort liability for 
ordinary negligence. Given the nature of public recreation in the state for residents and 
non-residents alike, Utah also has strong policy interests given the nature of the activity 
at issue, recreational horseback riding, the preinjury exculpatory agreement in this case is 
contrary to Utah's public policy of promoting public safety and deterring wrongful 
conduct by preserving tort remedies for ordinary negligence. The UAJ requests that the 
Court reverse the holding of the Utah Court of Appeals, and reaffirm Utah's public policy 
in favor of promoting public safety and deterring wrongful conduct through preserving 
tort liability. 
< 
i 
i x i 
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ARGUMENT 
I. PUBLIC POLICY IS A LEGITIMATE AND NECESSARY TOOL 
FOR EVALUATING PREINJURY RELEASES. 
Utah courts have relied on public policy in crafting the common law since prior to 
statehood. The first use of public policy by a Utah court appears to have occurred in 
1877, when the territorial court declared, "Concealment of the marriage contract is 
contrary to public policy and injurious to the best interests of society." More recently, in 
o 
Rothstein v. Snowbird Corp., this Court identified public policy as a basis for holding 
preinjury releases unenforceable: 
Preinjury releases from liability for one's negligence pit two bedrock legal 
concepts against one another: the right to order one's relationship with 
another by contract and the obligation to answer in damages when one 
injures another by breaching a duty of care. We have joined the majority of 
jurisdictions in permitting people to surrender their rights to recover in tort 
for the negligence of others. We have made it clear throughout our 
preinjury release jurisprudence, however, that contract cannot claim victory 
over tort in every instance. We have indicated that releases that are not 
sufficiently clear and unambiguous cannot be enforced. We have also 
indicated that we would refuse to enforce releases that offend public 
policy. 
7
 United States v. Miles, 2 Utah 19, 0-8 (Terr. 1877). 
8
 2007 UT 96, 175P.3d560. 
9 Rothstein v. Snowbird Corp., 2007 UT 96, ^ 6, 175 P.3d 560 (citing Berry v. 
Greater Park City Co., 2007 UT 87, U 12, 171 P-3d 442 and Hawkins v. Peart, 2001 UT 
94,H9,n.3,37P.3d442). 
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The court also noted, however, that public policy is a "protean substance,"10 and 
cautioned against it being relied upon as a basis for judicial determination "unless [it] is 
deducible in the given circumstances from constitutional or statutory provisions[.]"u 
In Rothstein, the legislature enacted a statute that struck a bargain in the interest of 
public policy: "ski area operators would be freed from liability for inherent risks of skiing 
so that they could continue to shoulder responsibility for noninherent risks by purchasing 
insurance." A 3-2 majority concluded that ski area operators' extraction of preinjury 
releases from skiers "breached this public policy bargain," and the releases were 
therefore unenforceable. 
The majority in Rothstein noted that, "[r]ead in its most restrictive sense," the 
statutory policy statement "simply announces that it is the public policy of Utah to bar 
skiers from recovering from recovering from ski area operators for injuries resulting from 
the inherent risks of skiing, as enumerated in the [statute]." Rather than injecting its 
"[P]ublic policy is a protean substance that is too often easily shaped to satisfy 
the preferences of a judge rather than the will of the people or the intentions of the 
Legislature." Rothstein v. Snowbird Corp., 2007 UT 96, If 10, 175 P.3d 560. Although 
the description may be carry a negative connotation, "protean" can also be understood as 
a positive attribute. Although it can mean "tending or able to change frequently or easily: 
it is difficult to comprehend the whole of this protean subject." The New Oxford 
American Dictionary, 3rd Ed., Oxford University Press. It also means "able to do many 
different things; versatile: Shostakovich was a remarkably protean composer, one at 
home in a wide range of styles." Id. 
11
 Rothstein, 2007 UT 96, If 10, 175 P.3d 560. 
nId. atlf 16. 
Id.; see also id. at f^ 20. 
7 
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own public policy views, however, the majority recognized that although the statute did 
not expressly invalidate preinjury releases, it nevertheless contained an implicit "public 
policy bargain"15 that precluded such releases from being enforced.16 Clearly, public 
policy is not only a legitimate resource, but is also a necessary tool, in determining the 
enforceability of preinjury releases. 
This case involves the Equine and Livestock Activities Act (the "Equine Act"),17 
but it is not the sole source of public policy. Statutes are but one of three sources from 
which public policy may be ascertained: "We have stated that a public policy is 'clear' if 
it is plainly defined by one of three sources: (1) legislative enactments; (2) constitutional 
standards; or (3) judicial decisions." And in Hansen v. America Online, Inc.} this 
Court explained: 
14MatTJ13. 
1 5 M a t ^ l 6 . 
See Snow v. Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel, 2007 UT 63, f^ 
13, 167 P.3d 1051 ("Occasionally, the expression of state policy from our legislative 
branch is not as clear and understandable as they, or we as citizens, might hope . . . . 
[W]hen the policy and the intent of the legislature is unclear with respect to a particular 
enactment, it is to the judicial branch of state government that we turn for clarification 
. . . . This process . . . was calculated by the framers of our form of government to be 
most likely to produce a correct result."). 
17
 Utah Code Ann. § 78B-4-201 et seq. 
18
 Rackley v. Fairview Care Centers, Inc., 2001 UT 32, \ 16, 23 P.3d 1022; see 
also Burton v. Exam. Ctr. Indus. & Gen. Med Clinic, Inc., 2000 UT 18, ^  6, 994 P.2d 
1261 (stating that "declarations of public policy can be found in constitutions and 
statutes"). See also Utah Pub. Employees Ass yn v. State, 2006 UT 9, \ 59, 131 P.3d 725 
(Parrish, J., concurring) (explaining that public policy is distinct from both legislative text 
and history). 
Q 
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We have no need to analyze the text of [a] statute [where] the issue before 
us is not one of statutory interpretation. The centerpiece of our inquiry is 
the strength and scope of public policy. In our effort to assay this question, 
we are not restricted to parsing statutory text and may properly look to 
many sources, including legislative history, which may illuminate the 
dimensions of the public policy at issue. 
Public policy interests are necessary considerations for the Court to make. 
As the U.S. Supreme Court has noted, "[w]here the enforcement of private 
agreements would be violative of [public] policy, it is the obligation of courts to refrain 
. . 9 1 . 
from such exertions of judicial power." While courts are wise to avoid "judicial 
mischief," they should not do so at the expense of the legitimate goal of preserving 
strong public policy. As former U.S. Supreme Court Justice Holmes wrote: 
The very considerations which judges most rarely mention, and always 
with an apology, are the secret root from which the law draws all the juices 
of life. I mean, of course, considerations of what is expedient for the 
community concerned. Every important principle which is developed by 
litigation is in fact and at bottom the result of more or less definitely 
19
 2004 UT 62, 96 P.3d 950. 
20
 Id. at f 15, n.7; see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 178, When A 
Term Is Unenforceable On Grounds Of Public Policy (1981) ("In weighing a public 
policy against enforcement of a term, account is taken of: (a) the strength of that policy 
as manifested by legislation or judicial decisions, (b) the likelihood that a refusal to 
enforce the term will further that policy.") (Emphasis added). 
21
 Hurdv. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 34-35 (1948). 
22
 See id. 
4 
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understood views of public policy; most generally, to be sure, under our 
practice and traditions, the unconscious result of instinctive preferences and 
inarticulate convictions, but nonetheless traceable to views of public policy 
in the last analysis.23 
The court of appeals failed to engage in a thorough public policy analysis due to 
the lack of an express legislative statement. It should not have concluded its analysis 
there, however. "Public policy is that principle of the law which holds that no subject can 
lawfully do that which has a tendency to be injurious to the public, or against the public 
good."24 When "public policy" is employed as shorthand, without more explanation and 
analysis, it becomes nothing more than conclusory—protean in the negative sense. 
However, when well-defined and applied analytically, public policy is a legitimate, 
necessary tool for evaluating the enforceability of preinjury releases. 
As the state constitution and common law show, Utah has a strong public policy 
interest in deterring unreasonable conduct through tort liability. As the following 
sections show, the constitution contains public policy in favor of preserving tort remedies 
as a means of deterring wrongful conduct and promoting public safety. These interests 
weigh against the use of preinjury releases for recreational activities, and warrant 
invalidation of the release. 
^ Oliver W. Holmes, THE COMMON LAW 35-36 (1881) (emphasis added). 
24
 Berube v. Fashion Ctr., Ltd., Ill P.2d 1033, 1043 (Utah 1989)(quotation 
omitted). 
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II. THE UTAH CONSTITUTION ENSHRINES THE PUBLIC POLICY 
INTEREST IN DETERRING WRONGFUL CONDUCT BY 
PRESERVING TORT LIABILITY. 
Public safety is good public policy. While tort law serves to compensate 
individual injured parties for their losses due to another's negligence, its primary purpose 
is to serve the broader public interest by deterring wrongful conduct: 
The association of negligence with purely compensatory damages has 
prompted the erroneous impression that liability for negligence is intended 
solely as a device for compensation. Its economic function is different; it is 
to deter uneconomical accidents. As it happens, the right amount of 
deterrence is produced by compelling negligent injurers to make good the 
victim's losses. 
The "traditional goals of tort law" are "deterrence and cost distribution."26 Indeed, 
deterrence of wrongful conduct "is at the core of all American tort law."27 "Tort liability 
has a powerful deterrent effect on future conduct and would do much to protect other[s] . 
. . from being harmed under similar circumstances." Accordingly, the framers of 
Utah's Constitution sought to explicitly protect and preserve the right to seek judicial 
redress. Two provisions address this issue: the Petition Clause and the Open Courts 
Clause. 
^ Condemarin v. University Hosp., 775 P.2d 348, 364 (Utah 1989) (quoting R. 
Posner, Economic Analysis of Law § 6.12, at 143 (1972) (footnote omitted)). 
26
 See Grundbergv. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89, 94 (Utah 1991). 
27
 Wood v. University of Utah Medical Center, 2002 UT 134, \ 83, 67 P.3d 436 
(Durham, C.J., dissenting). 
28
 See S.H. ex rel R.H. v. State, 865 P.2d 1363, 1365 (Utah 1993) (Stewart, J., 
dissenting). 
6 
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A. The Petition Clause Preserves Public Policy Interest in Deterring 
Wrongful Conduct. 
The Declaration of Rights in Utah's Constitution states, "All men have the 
inherent and inalienable r ight . . . to assemble peaceably, protest against wrongs, and 
petition for redress of grievances; to communicate freely their thoughts and opinions, 
being responsible for the abuse of that right."29 According to the Utah Supreme Court, 
this provision: 
[C]onstitute[s] the supreme law of the commonwealth upon this subject. To that 
law, the executive, the legislative, and the judicial departments of the government 
alike must bow obedience, as well as every subject. It forbids the abridgement by 
the state of the privileges and immunities of all citizens . . . . These are inherent 
and inalienable rights of citizens, and are constitutional guaranties. An enactment, 
therefore, which deprives a person arbitrarily of. . . some part of his personal 
liberty, is just as much inhibited by the supreme law as one which would deprive 
him of life.30 
Though there has been little discussion of the Petition Clause in Utah's appellate 
courts, the plain language of the clause reveals its meaning. "Independent analysis must 
begin with the constitutional text and rely on whatever assistance legitimate sources may 
provide in the interpretive process." Indeed, "[t]he interpretation of the protections 
afforded by the Utah Constitution appropriately commences with a review of the 
constitutional text."32 
29
 Utah Const. Art. I, § 1 (1896) (emphasis added). 
30
 Block v. Schwartz, 27 Utah 387, 76 P. 22, 24-25 (1904). 
31
 State v. Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, t 37, 162 P.3d 1106. 
32
 Am. Bush v. City o/S. Salt Lake, 2006 UT 40,110, 140 P.3d 1235. 
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A "petition" is "[a] formal written request presented to a court or other official 
body . . . . In some states, a lawsuit's first pleading."33 In Kish v. Wright?* the Utah 
Supreme Court recognized that "the Constitution of Utah . . . gives its citizens the 
'inherent and inalienable' right to petition a state tribunal for redress of grievances in 
civil actions." Thus, under a plain meaning analysis, a petition for redress of grievances 
is the same as a civil action. The right to bring a civil action is therefore considered an 
"inherent and inalienable right" by the Utah Constitution. 
The clause's significance is further illuminated by its history, as well as its 
context. In selecting the phrasing, the framers noted that the consecutive ordering 
contemplated that the rights of assembly, protest, and petition mutually served "the 
purpose of communicating [the people's] thoughts." The framers also explained that 
"[w]e put in our bill of rights a declaration that the right of petition of the people should 
not be taken away from them." And they declared that "one of the very first articles 
that we passed in this Constitutional Convention was an article upon the declaration of < 
rights, following out of the principle laid down in Magna Charta, and the principles in our 
own Declaration of Independence, that the right of petition shall never be ignored, and we 
1 
33
 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1182 (8th ed. 2004). 
34
 562 P.2d 625 (Utah 1977). , 
35
 Id. at 627; see also In re Anderson, 2004 UT 7, \ 68, 82 P.3d 1134 ("In filing a 
civil action . . . Judge Anderson exercised his right to petition for redress of grievances."). 
361 OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONVENTION < 
229 (Salt Lake City, Star Printing Co. 1898). 
31
 Id. at 1182. 
R 
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have in our article on the declaration of rights declared in favor of the right of petition."38 
The framers* reverence for the right of petition is not surprising; at the time Utah attained 
statehood, it was already well-settled that "[t]he very idea of a government, republican in 
form, implies a right on the part of its citizens . . . to petition for a redress of 
grievances." 
The historical record establishes that Utah's constitutional framers recognized the 
petition right as an independently significant free expression right. Significantly, courts 
are forums for "free and open expression."40 The U.S. Supreme Court has expressly 
recognized that judicial petitions for civil redress "are modes of expression . . . protected 
by the First and Fourteenth Amendments," and are subject to judicial protection.41 As the 
Court explained, "litigation is not [just] a technique of resolving private differences; it is 
a means for achieving . . . lawful objectives."42 In such circumstances, "[i]t is thus a form 
of political expression."43 
38
 M at 1455. 
39
 U.S. v. CruikshanK 92 U.S. 542, 552 (1875). 
40
 See Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41,127, 164 P.3d 366. Pratt addressed the 
judicial proceeding privilege, which is recognized as necessary to facilitate the "free and 
open expression by all participants." Id. (citing Allen v. Ortez, 802 P.2d 1307, 1311 
(Utah 1990)). 
41
 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428 (1963). 
42Id 
43
 Id 
n 
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The petition right's inclusion with other freedoms of expression is no mere 
coincidence. The right is intrinsically associated with expression, and should be 
weighted and analyzed accordingly. It goes without saying that Utah is a common law 
state, and while statutes supersede the common law,44 its development is nevertheless a 
critical part of state government. The common law can only be developed where disputes 
are adjudicated by the courts, in a public forum; this is the essence of the expressive 
nature of the petition right. If preinjury releases are enforced, there is no deterrence, and 
no contribution is made to the common law. Deterring wrongful conduct and promoting 
public safety are certainly "lawful objectives," and are enshrined in the state's founding 
charter. 
Reflecting on his fifty-year legal career, Utah Federal Judge J. Thomas Greene 
mourned the erosion of traditional civil litigation.45 He noted: 
[W]e should not forget that the fundamental purpose of the courts is to 
litigate differences, and that citizens have a right to litigate. In this regard, 
Supreme Court Justice Harlan pointed out that litigation is not a scurrilous 
or evil thing, and that the right to litigate is derived from the First 
Amendment guarantee of the right to petition for redress of grievances. He 
said, "We have passed the point where litigation is regarded as an evil that 
must be avoided if some accommodation short of a lawsuit can possibly be 
worked out. Litigation is often the desirable and orderly way of obtaining 
vindication of fundamental rights. 
\ 
44
 See Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-2. 
45
 J. Thomas Greene, Reflections of a Senior Judge, 232 F.R.D. 425 (October 14, 
2005). 
10 
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Similarly, the Supreme Court said, "[0]ver the course of centuries, our 
society has settled upon civil litigation as a means for redressing 
grievances, resolving disputes, and vindicating rights . . . . That our citizens 
have access to their civil courts is not an evil to be regretted; rather, it is an 
attribute of our system of justice in which we ought to take pride."46 
Permitting the enforcement of preinjury releases that are required preconditions to 
participating in recreational activities such as horseback riding abridges the petition right 
and forecloses public expression, thereby defeating the deterrent effect of tort law. The 
public policy interest in petitioning for redress publicizes negligence, resulting in 
deterrence and promoting public safety. If private parties are permitted to immunize 
themselves from ordinary negligence claims through the use of preinjury releases, not 
only is access to justice denied, but recreational activities will become less safe due to the 
loss of deterrence. Enforcement of the preinjury release in this case is contrary to the 
public policy inherent in the Utah Constitution's Petition Clause. 
B. The Open Courts Clause Reinforces Utah's Policy Interest in Public 
Adjudication of Private Disputes to Deter Further Wrongful 
Conduct. 
Utah's constitutional Open Courts Clause states: 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his 
person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, 
which shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no 
person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in 
this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party.47 
Id. at 440-41 (emphasis in original). 
Utah Const. Art. I, § 11. 
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This provision guarantees access to a public judicial forum where parties can obtain 
substantive redress of their grievances. It embodies a "higher principle[ ] of justice,"48 
and, like the Petition Clause, reflects the framers' policy interest in preserving the civil 
justice system as a means of resolving disputes and deterring wrongful conduct. 
Additionally, the Open Courts Clause preserves access to a public judicial forum 
wherein petitions for the redress of grievances may be heard. Certainly, the mutual 
inclusion of the term "redress" in the Petition and Open Courts Clauses supports their 
interrelatedness: petitions state the claims to be redressed, and courts are forums in which 
such petitions are entertained. When private disputes are adjudicated in public forums, 
there is a greater deterrent effect. When negligence occurs in silence, and public 
consequences escaped, there is little disincentive to refrain from further unreasonable 
conduct. The Open Courts Clause ensures access to a public forum where common law 
can be made through the publication of private grievances. 
These constitutional provisions and judicial decisions clearly establish Utah's < 
strong public policy interest in favor of preserving negligence causes of action, and weigh 
against foreclosure of the right to seek judicial redress by the enforcement of preinjury 
releases.49 
48
 See Zamora v. Draper, 635 P.2d 78, 81 (Utah 1981). 
49
 See Anderson Development Co. v. Tobias, 2005 UT 36, 116 P.3d 323 
(recognizing the public policy in favor of preserving "free access to the courts" and 
against depriving "the individual a fair opportunity to present his or her claim," See id. at I 
T( 59 (quotations and internal citations omitted)). 
12 
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The legislature has already granted the recreational industry broad immunity for 
injuries suffered as a result of the inherent risks of an activity. This enables private 
parties to operate recreational businesses for a profit, amd preserves access to liability 
insurance. Permitting these businesses to further immunize themselves against claims for 
ordinary negligence, however, violates Utah's public policy interest in promoting public 
safety by deterring negligent conduct. As discussed in the next section, this is the 
essence of tort law. 
III. TORT LAW PROMOTES THE PUBLIC GOOD. 
As discussed above, tort law provides not only a means to compensation50 for 
people harmed by the negligence of another person's conduct, but also establishes a 
sound deterrent and encourages others to act with reasonable care.51 The courts 
consistently "evaluate whether the effect of tort liability would promote public safety." 
"Tort liability has a powerful deterrent effect on future conduct and would do much to 
CO 
protect other children from being harmed under similar circumstances.'5 The public 
policy in favor of tort law mitigates the flow of damages away from the tortfeasor and 
50
 Condemarin v. Univ. Hosp., 775 P.2d 348, 364 (Utah 1989) (in addition to 
compensation, tort law is intended to "deter uneconomical accidents.") 
51
 Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 858 P.2d 970, 976 (Utah 1993) (Allowing 
medical surveillance damages for toxic-tort plaintiffs "furthers the deterrent function of 
the tort system by compelling those who expose others to toxic substances to minimize 
risks and costs of exposure."). 
52
 DeBry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428, 440 (Utah 1995). 
53
 S.K ex rel R.K v. State, 865 P.2d 1363, 1365 (Utah 1993). 
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back onto the public at large through welfare, insurance and entitlement programs.^ In 
sum, the authorities consistently validate the general good and sound public policy 
supporting a system which maintains accountability of those who act with carelessness. 
These principles underlying tort law are so substantial and fundamental that there can be 
virtually no question as to their importance for the public good. 
Importantly, the deterrent effect of negligence "belong[s] to society, not individual 
parties, and societal interests should outweigh private interests [over] freedom of 
contract."55 Any decision to validate a private contract which shifts burdens to the public 
must be "based on prior ... judicial decisions, applying only those principles which are so 
substantial and fundamental that there can be virtually no question as to their importance 
for promotion of the public good."56 
Appellee Sundance stands on a mistaken assumption: that this Court will never 
entertain or consider public policy arguments against exculpatory contracts. Berry v. 
Greater Park City Co., in fact, holds quite the opposite. "The right to contract is always 
en 
subordinate to the obligation to stand accountable for one's negligent acts." Being 
W. Page Keeton et al, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 4 at 25 
(5th ed. 1984) ("courts are concerned not only with compensation of the victim, but with 
admonition of the wrongdoer. When the decisions of the courts become known, and 
defendants realize that they may be held liable, there is of course a strong incentive to 
prevent the occurrence of harm."). 
55
 Berlangieri v. Running Elk Corp., 76 P.3d 1098, 1105 (N.M. 2003) (refusing to 
uphold exculpatory contract after injury during horseback riding activity). 
56
 Berube v. Fashion Ctr., Ltd., Ill P.2d 1033, 1043 (Utah 1989). 
14 
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subordinate; the validity of exculpatory pre-injury releases may still be called into 
question. Berry stopped short of holding all preinjury releases unenforceable as a matter 
of public policy. Rather, Berry recognized that the right to contract away one's right to 
recover damages for the negligence of another is "subject to many conditions and 
CO 
limitations," including limitations of public policy. 
Berry went on to note that the public policy considerations in that case merely fell 
"short of convincing us that freedom to contract should always yield to the right to 
recover damages on the basis of another's fault."59 Wliile pre-injury releases for damage 
due to another's negligence may not 'always' yield, there may still be occasions which 
warrant invalidation of the exculpatory contract as contrary to public policy. 
Accordingly, there remain "exceptions to the general principle that pre injury releases are 
enforceable."60 In Pearce v. Utah Athletic Found., this Court confirmed that there remain 
exceptions to the 'general rule' that "people may contract away their rights to recover in 
tort for damages caused by the ordinary negligence of others."61 
" Berry v. Greater Park City Co., 2007 UT 87,1 11, 171 P.3d 442, 445-46. 
58
 Seeid.^UAl. 
59
 Id. at Tf 11 (emphasis added). 
60Mat1Jl3. 
61
 Pearce v. Utah Athletic Found., 2008 UT 13, U 14, 179 P.3d 760, 765 
(observing that public policy, public interest and ambiguity all remain valid objections to 
enforcement of an exculpatory contract). 
1 ^ 
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Berry acknowledged the "legal and social philosophy" favoring invalidation of 
preinjury releases. But, another public policy not yet considered by Utah courts also 
favors invalidation. As one commentator has explained: 
What legal, equitable, or public policy justification exists to allow for-profit 
businesses to require their customers to contractually waive liability for 
their own negligence? This question is especially important when one 
considers that business owners and service providers can easily protect 
themselves with liability insurance and pass the cost of that protection on to 
their customers. 
In fact, in all but the least responsible businesses (and therefore the most 
likely to injure or kill someone) they do have insurance. . . . Thus, 
perversely, the law as it presently exists is detrimental to the legitimate 
interests of consumers and serves only to protect the coffers of business 
insurers whose policy holders are required to carry coverage but obliged to 
deny it.62 
The public policy principles underlying tort law are so substantial and 
fundamental that there is no good reason to question their importance for the public good. 
Thus, when parties seek to exculpate themselves from the consequences of their own 
negligence, and ultimately force those costs back upon the public at large, courts should 
reject that request as antithetical to public good unless a countervailing public good can 
be gained. Here, the ability to arrange one's affairs as one sees fit must yield to the 
overall public good achieved through the deterrent and compensatory effects of 
remaining accountable and liable for harm caused by one's own negligence. 
I 
62
 Steve Russell, Pre-Injury Releases: A Problem Easily Solved, UTAH TRIAL J. 7, 
10 (Winter/Spring 2010) (emphasis in original). 
16 
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A private, preinjury release increases profits for business, relieving them of steps 
otherwise necessary to fully meet their obligations of reasonable care to society at large. 
A private exculpatory contract then shifts costs and consequences of negligently 
conducted business back onto the public at large through increased health care costs, 
reliance on public welfare and aid programs, lost wage earning and lost services to 
families. 
Businesses that contract around their duty of reasonable care lower the cost of 
doing business, but at the expense of the public at large. For-profit business should not be 
allowed to escape their liability and shift those costs to the public at large by way of a 
private contract. 
Courts should not condone and encourage for-profit enterprise that entice others to 
pursue risky activities under the guise of professional supervision. Allowing for-profit 
businesses to immunize themselves against negligence in the very arena wherein they 
hold themselves out as experts serves and promotes no societal benefits. "There can be no 
doubt concerning the duty of this Court to invalidate contracts which have a tendency to 
be injurious to the public welfare." More recently this Court observed that, in addition 
to violation of legislatively expressed policy, contracts may also be struck down because 
enforcement "harmed the public as a whole—not just an individual."64 
63
 Frailey v. McGarry, 116 Utah 504, 516-17, 211 P.2d 840, 847 (1949). 
64
 Ockey v. Lehmer, 2008 UT 37, ^ 23, 189 P.3d 51 (citation omitted) (ultimately 
upholding trust contract because it'did not harm the general public'). 
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If an activity is so dangerous that the recreational outfitter cannot obtain liability 
insurance without also exacting an exculpatory contract immunizing them against their 
own negligence, then perhaps the courts should refrain from allowing, encouraging, 
supporting and promoting such dangerous businesses. In effect, upholding an exculpatory 
contract disturbs the free market by subsidizing and passing on the costs of negligence to 
society at large where the free market has already determined that the services provided 
may not be worth their cost because insurance cannot be obtained. 
IV. OVERLY BROAD RELEASES THAT IMMUNIZE AGAINST 
HARM "FOR ANY REASON" VIOLATE PUBLIC POLICY. 
Exculpatory contracts which release liability "for any reason" offend public 
policy. In Mettler ex rel Burnett v. Nellis the court also dealt with an exculpatory 
• i 
contract in a horseback riding case. The pre-injury release immunized against "any 
liability or responsibility for any accident damage, injury or illness and was "broad 
enough to include intentional behavior."65 The court held that "an exculpatory contract { 
contravenes public policy when it would absolve the tortfeasor from any injury to the 
victim for any reason."66 An exculpatory agreement will generally be held to contravene 
public policy if it is so broad "that it would absolve [the defendant] from any injury to the 
[plaintiff] for any reason." 
i 
65
 Mettler ex rel. Burnett v. Nellis, 695 N.W.2d 861. 865 (Wis. Ct. App. 2005). 
66
 Id. I 
67
 Richards v. Richards, 513 N.W.2d 118, 121 (Wis. 1994). 
18 
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The release in this case is so broad that it also offends notions of public good: 
Paragraph 1. "I expressly agree to assume all risks of personal injury, falls, 
accidents, and/or property damage, including those resulting from any 
negligence of Sundance." 
Paragraph 2. " . . . agree to indemnify and hold SUNDANCE harmless 
from all claims, damages or injuries in any way related to my participation 
in Horseback Riding . . . . " "My release includes all claims regarding the 
design, maintenance . . . , products liability." 
Paragraph 3. "I agree that no lawsuit will be filed by me or on my behalf 
against SUNDANCE as a result of my participation in Horseback Riding, 
use of any facilities or for any injuries or damages that I sustain even if 
SUNDANCE was negligent." 
Paragraphs 1 and 3 are so broad as to release injury for any reason whatsoever, making 
the exculpatory contract so broad as to be unenforceable. 
Further, Paragraph 2 is particularly offensive because it impermissibly prohibits 
claims based upon products liability. Under Utah law. parties may not avoid liability for 
products liability. "On grounds of public policy, parties to a contract may not generally 
exempt a seller of a product from strict tort liability for physical harm to a user or 
consumer unless the exemption term is fairly bargained for and is consistent with the 
policy underlying that [strict tort] liability.68 
05
 Interwest Const v. Palmer, 923 P.2d 1350, 1356 (Utah 1996) (quoting 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 195(3) (1981)). 
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Accordingly, the shear breadth and scope of the release at issue in this case has 
already been found to be in violation of sound public policy principles. This case marks 
an opportunity for the Court to reinforce those public policy principles by reaffirming 
that such overreaching exculpatory contracts will not be tolerated. 
V. THE EQUINE LIABILITY ACT PRESERVES NEGLIGENCE 
CLAIMS AGAINST ACTIVITY SPONSORS. 
In Pearce v. Utah Athletic Found., the court held that "recreational activities do 
not constitute a public interest and that, therefore, preinjury releases for recreational 
activities cannot be invalidated under the public interest exception."69 However, in 
Pearce the court did not have before it any statutory regulation which evinced or 
supported a "public interest." Here, by contrast, there is an express statutorily recognized 
public interest by virtue of the Equine Act. Accordingly, a blanket prohibition against 
considering exculpatory clauses for recreational activities is overcome by legislation 
which demonstrates the recreational activity to be a public interest worthy of regulation. 
Under the Equine Liability Act, activity sponsors are "not liable for injury to or 
the death of a participant due to the inherent risks associated with [horseback riding]." 
However, the legislature chose to preserve responsibility for negligence. Sponsors remain 
liable for harm if they "provided the equipment... and an equipment failure was due to 
Pearce v. Utah Athletic Found., 2008 UT 13, % 17, 179 P.3d 760, 766. I 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-4-202(2) (West 2012). 
90 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the sponsors negligence, or, "failed to make reasonable efforts to determine whether 
the equine or livestock could behave in a manner consistent with the activity and with the 
79 7^ 
participant,' or, commit "an act or omission that constitutes negligence." Sundance 
attempted to avoid exactly what the statute retained - liability for negligence. 
When determining whether to void an exculpatory clause, Hawkins and several 
other Utah decisions cited with approval Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cat. Tunkl 
surveyed the case law at the time and arrived at a "rough outline" of the factors which 
typically cause invalidation of exculpatory clauses. In Berry v. Greater Park City Co., 
the court adopted the Tunkl factors as a means for evaluating exculpatory clauses. Here, 
all but two of those factors are satisfied. 
In the face of a clearly expressed public policy, Sundance's exculpatory contract 
violates the first factor under a Tunkl analysis: "[The transaction] concerns a business of a 
11
 Id. at (2)(a)(iii). 
72
 M a t (3). 
73
 Id. at (d)(i). 
74
 See Hawkins at j^ 9. See also Pearce v. Utah Athletic Found., 2008 UT 13, f 
17, 179 P.3d 760; and Berry v. Greater Park City Co., 2007 UT 87,1 15, 171 P.3d 442. 
75
 Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cat, 3 83 P.2d 441, 445 (Cal. 1963). 
Admittedly, horseback riding recreational activities are neither a "service of 
great importance to the public, which is often a matter of practical necessity for some 
members of the public", or an "essential service." See, e.g., Berry, 2007 UT 87, *[  10, 171 
P.3d442. 
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type generally thought suitable for public regulation." Because the Equine Act 
expressly retains liability for negligence or the failure to exercise reasonable care, it 
espouses a public interest in favor of maintaining that liability. Private parties should not 
be allowed to contract around a legislatively announced obligation to exercise reasonable 
care. 
Further, because the legislature chose to use the word "negligence" and the phrase 
"failed to make reasonable efforts," there is no question regarding the purpose of the 
statute unlike the situation in Rothstein v. Snowbird. The Rothstein majority, interpreting 
the inherent risks of skiing act, had before it no express reservation of negligence within 
the statutory language. Rothstein therefore looked toward the expressed public policy and 
came to the inescapable conclusion that liability for negligence wras retained under the ski 
act. Here, by contrast, the retention for liability of negligence is expressly made within 
the Equine Act. The legislature reserved the right and ability of participants to bring 
claims for negligence as well as a duty for operators to exercise reasonable care. ' 
The other Tunkl factors are also present in this case. It appears that Sundance 
holds itself out as willing to perform the horseback riding for hire service to any member 
of the public.79 Sundance also makes no provision whereby a purchaser may pay 
i 
77
 Berry, 2007 UT 87,1 10, 171 P.3d 442. 
78
 Rothstein v. Snowbird Corp., 2007 UT 96, ^ 16, 175 P.3d 560. I 
79
 Factor 3, see Berry v. Greater Park City Co., 2007 UT 87,1 10, 171 P.3d 442. 
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additional fees to obtain protection against negligence. And, finally, the purchaser is left 
wholly under the control of Sundance and its choice of horse, equipment and 
direction/instructions.81 Particularly telling, the Equine Act itself supports the application 
of this last factor by declaring that participants may still bring an action if the providers 
do not choose a suitable mount or properly prepare and apply the riding gear. 
Family friendly activities also justify a more restricted approach to immunizing 
against liability than high risk, extreme sports activities. The case currently at bar, unlike 
Berry or Pearce, involves a much milder activity. Berry considered a competitive, elbow 
to elbow race between competitive skiers who were all vying to reach the finish line first. 
Pearce addressed the somewhat obvious, but thrilling, risks associated with bobsledding 
on an Olympic class facility. Here, Sundance provides the opportunity to "catch a view of 
beautiful Stewart falls, listen to the sounds of nature, and enjoy your cowboy guide as 
he/she leads you on a trail ride with your trusty mountain horse." Further, Sundance 
offered this experience with the caveat that their "trails are walking only" and the 
opportunity for a "Chuck Wagon Dinner" following horseback rides. The recreational 
activity at issue can hardly be said to be of the same quality in terms of the experience, 
the dangers expected or the thrill sought out as the activities in either Pearce or Berry. 
Factor 5, see id. 
Factor 6, see id. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-4-202 (3) and (2)(a)(iii) (West 2012). 
See "Sundance Activities: Horseback Riding" (attached as "Addendum A"). 
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Although horseback riding is depicted as a leisurely activity at Sundance, 
horseback riding accounts for a disproportionate share of emergency room injuries. 
According to a 2008 report released by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 
horseback riding accounted for a greater percentage of traumatic brain injury to children 
than ice skating, riding ATVs, sledding or bicycling.84 After reviewing available 
statistical data, another study concluded that "Horseback riding is considered more 
dangerous than motorcycle riding, skiing, automobile racing, football and rugby."85 
A medical study done in 2006 revealed that "[e]ven though horse related activities 
have fewer participants than other sports and recreation activities, horseback riding is the 
eighth leading cause of emergency department treated, sports and recreation related 
o/: 
injuries among female participants." This same study concluded that "[hjorse related 
injuries are a public health concern not just for riders but for anyone in close contact with 
horses." Considering these statistics, and analyzing similar equine liability acts, it is not 
surprising that other state courts invalidated exculpatory releases for negligence of the 
owners of equine activities. 
CDC Data & Statistics | Feature: Nonfatal Traumatic Brain Injuries (TBIs), 
http://www.cdc.gov/datastatistics/2008/brainInjuries/ (last visited Jan. 3, 2012). 
85
 Ten years of major equestrian injury: are we addressing functional outcomes?, 
http://w^^w.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2653027/ (last visited Jan. 3, 2012). 
86
 Medical Non-fatal horse related injuries treated in emergency departments in 
the United States, 2001-2003, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2564310/ 
(last visited Jan. 3, 2012). 
1A 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
New Mexico has also enacted an Equine Liability Act. New Mexico's statute is 
strikingly similar to Utah's Equine Act. The New Mexico act first provides immunity for 
injuries which occur as part of a horseback riding activity. But, the act goes on, as does 
the Utah act, to retain liability for faulty equipment and failure to make a reasonable and 
prudent effort to assure that the animal and participant were appropriate for the activity. 
Unlike the Utah Equine Act, New Mexico does not expressly retain liability for plain 
negligence. However, the New Mexico Supreme Court nonetheless struck down an 
exculpatory clause under the Turikl analysis. 
In Berlangieri v. Running Elk Corp., the court found the existence of the statute to 
provide a sufficient basis upon which to invalidate exculpatory contract on the basis an 
application of the Tunkl factors. The court first observed that the Equine Liability Act 
"very clearly expresses a policy that equine operators should not be held liable for equine 
o n 
behavior." The court went on to note, however, that the Act also contains a qualifier, as 
does Utah statute, which retained liability for the acts or omissions of the operator which 
OQ 
constituted negligence. The defendant argued there, as does the defendant in the instant 
case, the retention of negligence served only to "limit the definition of conduct for which 
it cannot be held liable."90 
87
 N.M. St. § 42-13-4 (West 2012). 
88
 Berlangieri v. Running Elk Corp., 76 P.3d 1098, 1110 (N.M. 2003) 
89
 Id. 
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The court, however, stated that "the legislative intent goes further than that to 
express a policy that equine operators should be accountable for their own negligence."91 
"[T]he legislature used a manner of writing that evidences the intent that patrons of 
[horse riding businesses] should be able to make claims against them for negligence, but 
not for equine behavior." "Thus, the Act expresses in general terms a policy that 
operators should be held liable for negligence, but not for events beyond their control." 
Prior to invalidating the exculpatory contract, the court observed that the New Mexico 
"Act would do little more than codify the common law as it exists if it were to only 
provide that, absent a release, operators may be held liable for their negligence but not for 
injuries caused by equine behavior that is not the operators'fault"94 
Because of the legislation, the court found that the first Tunkl factor had been met. 
Additionally, the court found all but two of the Tunkl factors to weigh against 
enforcement of the exculpatory contract. The court found that the horse riding business 
was opened to the public, did not offer a way for participants to expand their protection 
by purchasing additional coverage, and please participants within the control of an 
subject to the risk of carelessness by the businesses employees.95 
91
 id. 
92
 id. 
92
 id. 
94
 Ma t 1112. 
95
 Id. at 1112-13. 
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Similarly, the Connecticut courts struck down an exculpatory clause in a 
recreational horseback riding case. In Connecticut, the act immunized 'inherent risks, but 
retained liability if "the injury was proximately caused by the negligence of the person 
providing the horse or horses."96 In striking down the exculpatory provision, the court 
observed "that the legislature has stopped short of requiring participants to bear the very 
risk that the defendants now seek to pass on to the plaintiff by way of a mandatory 
release."97 Thus, the "attempt contractually to extend the plaintiffs assumption of risk 
one step beyond that identified by the legislature [] violates the public policy of the state 
Oft 
and, therefore, is invalid." Finally, the Connecticut court made one other,observation 
which also applies to the case under consideration by this Court. 
In sum, the legislature preserved negligence liability for a recreational activity 
which is sold and marketed as family friendly. Other states considering similar legislative 
acts also strike down exculpatory contracts based on a Tunkl analysis. The contract at 
issue here should, similarly, be invalidated because it offends our legislature's express 
retention of negligence for seemingly benign, but statistically hazardous, activity. 
96
 Connecticut Statute § 52-557p (West 2012). 
97
 Reardonv. Windswept Farm, LLC, 905 A.2d 1156, 1162 (Conn. 2006). 
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CONCLUSION 
Allowing for-profit business to shift the costs associated with their irresponsible 
conduct back upon society at large through a private exculpatory contract served no valid 
societal interest. The public good served by tort law effects an appropriate distribution 
back upon the wrongdoer far outweighs the ability privately contract to the detriment of 
the public at large. Utah's constitution and historical case authority recognize a strong 
public policy in favor of tort law. 
Utah is a beautiful state with attractive wilderness and unparalleled recreational 
opportunities. In order to promote public safety, and ensure that recreational activities 
are conducted responsibly, the Court should enforce the public policy interests inherent in 
the Utah State Constitution and the common tort law by ensuring public access to the 
courts for the redress of grievances. This public policy interest is consistent with the 
legislative objectives of the Equine Act, and will preserve the well-being of the public. 
The Court should reverse the Utah Court of Appeals, and remand the instant action for 
further proceedings. 
> • * . • • • • . . 
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ADDENDUM A 
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1.877.831.6224 Current Weather 
Scenic Lift Rides 
Hiking Trails 
Mountain Biking 
Fly Fishing 
Horseback Riding 
- Horse Trail Rides 
River Rafting 
Golfing 
horseback riding 
Located in one of the most beautiful mountain ranges in the world, the 
stables are the perfect place to experience horseback riding at it's finest. 
Enjoy breathtaking scenery as you traverse through pristine mountain 
terrain. Catch a view of the beautiful Stewart Falls, listen to the sounds of 
nature, and enjoy your cowboy guide as he/she leads you on a trail ride 
with your trusty mountain horse. 
Here at the stables we know the value in your experiences and memories. 
We want them to remain personal to you and your party. All rides are 
private or no more than 6 people per ride. We don't believe in long lines 
and boring nose to tail rides. Our stables have one of the best trail systems 
in the world. You will be captivated by the mountain surroundings and 
scenery. All rides are conducted by Boulder Mountain Ranch, our preferred 
horseback riding outfitter. 
General Information 
• Reservations are required. All rides must be scheduled at: least 24 hours 
in advance. Contact our Concierge to make a reservation. 
• All rides are western style and include a short instructional arena lesson 
before trip begins. 
• Children must be at least 8 years or older to participate on a trail ride. 
Children under the age of 18 must be accompanied by an adult. 
• One rider per horse—absolutely no double riding. 
• Our trails are walking only. 
• There is no weight limit. However, riders must be physically able to 
mount their horse unassisted. 
• Group discounts are available (50% deposit required for all groups larger 
than 15 and/or any private function or activity). 
• Maximum group size is 20 guests with one guide per six guests. 
• Groups of 6 or more are automatically charged an 18% gratuity. 
• Ride times are approximate due to different variables theit can come up 
on each ride. 
• Please arrive 20 minutes prior to scheduled ride. 
Chuck Wagon Dinner 
• We offer a wonderful Chuck Wagon dinner every Saturday at 4:30 pm. 
Includes wagon ride to Elk Meadows for Cowboy Dinner (menu varies 
occationally, call for more details). Groups of 12 or more can be 
scheduled any day of the week. Must make a reservation 24 hours in 
advance. 
Cancellation Policy 
• Cancellations inside of 24 hours will be charged in full 
• Group reservations for 7 or more people require a 72 hour cancellation 
notice. 
Times and pricing subject to change at any time without notice. 
")); 
Contact Us | Directions | Site Map | Privacy Policy 
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